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The 2006 North Korean nuclear test was the detonation of a nuclear device conducted by North Korea on October 9, 2006. North Korea announced its intention to conduct a test on October 3, six days prior, and in doing so became the first nation to give warning of its first nuclear test.〔("N. Korea to conduct 'safe' nuclear test" ), ''UPI'', October 3, 2006〕 The blast is estimated to have had an explosive force of less than one kiloton, and some radioactive output was detected. United States officials suggested the device may have been a nuclear explosive that misfired.〔 An anonymous official at the North Korean Embassy in Beijing told a South Korean newspaper that the explosive output was smaller than expected.〔(" Dud or deception? Experts examine N. Korea claims" ), ''CNN'', October 10, 2006〕 Because of the secretive nature of North Korea and small yield of the test, there remains some question as to whether it was a successful test of an unusually small device (which would have required sophisticated technology), or a partially failed "fizzle" or dud. A scientific paper later estimated the yield as 0.48 kilotons.〔Lian-Feng Zhao, Xiao-Bi Xie, Wei-Min Wang, and Zhen-Xing Yao, "(Regional Seismic Characteristics of the 9 October 2006 North Korean Nuclear Test ), ''Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America'', December 2008 98:2571-2589; doi:10.1785/0120080128〕 It was reported that the government of the People's Republic of China was given a 20-minute advance warning that the test was about to occur. China sent an emergency alert to Washington, D.C., through the U.S. embassy in Beijing at which time President George W. Bush was told by National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley "shortly after" 10 p.m. (UTC-5) that a test was imminent. == Background == (詳細はplutonium-producing Magnox nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, and various diplomatic means had been used by the international community to attempt to limit North Korea's nuclear work to peaceful and scientific means and encouraging North Korea to participate in international treaties. In 1994, the United States and North Korea signed the "Agreed Framework", whereby North Korea agreed to freeze its graphite moderated reactor program in exchange for fuel, moves toward normalization of political and economic relations, and the construction of two modern nuclear power plants powered by light-water reactors. Eventually, North Korea's existing nuclear facilities were to be dismantled, and the spent reactor fuel taken out of the country. However, in 2002, rumors circulated that North Korea was pursuing both uranium enrichment technology and plutonium reprocessing technologies in defiance of the Agreed Framework. North Korea reportedly told American diplomats in private that they were in possession of nuclear weapons, citing American failures to uphold their own end of the "Agreed Framework" as a motivating force. North Korea later clarified that it did not possess weapons yet, but that it had a right to possess them. In late 2002 and early 2003, North Korea began to take steps to eject International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors while re-routing spent fuel rods for plutonium reprocessing for weapons purposes. Throughout the course of 2003, North Korean and American officials exchanged harsh words and staged military exercises which were interpreted by the other party to be aggressive. As late as the end of 2003, North Korea claimed that it would freeze its nuclear program in exchange for American concessions – in particular a non-aggression treaty – but a final agreement was not reached and talks continued to be cancelled or fall through. North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003 after not receiving light-water reactors promised by the United States which were going to be delivered in exchange for North Korea not developing their own power plants, as understood in the "Agreed Framework". In early 2004 former Los Alamos National Laboratory director Siegfried S. Hecker, as part of an unofficial U.S. delegation, was allowed to inspect North Korea's plutonium production facilities. Hecker later testified before the United States Congress that while North Korea seems to have successfully extracted plutonium from the spent fuel rods, he saw no evidence at the time that they had actually produced a workable weapon.〔(Visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center in North Korea ), Siegfried S. Hecker, January 21, 2004〕 In 2007, the former senior scientist of Pakistan, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan claimed that North Korea's nuclear program was well advanced before his visit in 1993 with Benazir Bhutto, former prime minister.〔(ABC News: ABC Exclusive: Pakistani Bomb Scientist Breaks Silence )〕 In September 2004, though, North Korean officials announced they had successfully processed Yongbyon plutonium into a workable nuclear deterrent. Through 2005 more diplomatic talks were attempted between the United States, North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia (the six-party talks) but little concrete change occurred. Because North Korea had not conducted a successful test of a nuclear device, the extent of its nuclear weapons program remained ambiguous through 2005 and much of 2006. Though North Korea conducted numerous missile tests (some of which were branded failures by international experts), the question of whether they had actually mastered all aspects of nuclear weapons technology – ranging from material production to complex nuclear weapon design needed to produce the final detonation – remained unanswered. there was agreement in the U.S. intelligence community that North Korea could build a "modest" bomb with a yield of between 6 to 10 kilotons, but disagreement between Defense Intelligence Agency, CIA and the United States State Department over whether it could deploy a miniaturized warhead on a missile. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「2006 North Korean nuclear test」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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